“the analyst is as thoroughly in the process as the patient, becomes aware of this at some point, and then addresses the interaction” (1987, p. 209). Though there are similarities between Fromm’s focus and Hirsch’s emphasis, the general thrust of their approaches and their use of the concept of observant participation is very different. Coparticipant inquiry, in my view, incorporates the best aspects of both Fromm’s and Hirsch’s concepts of analytic participation. A broader concept than observant participation, coparticipant inquiry includes what Fromm and Hirsch both overlook. 2. Perhaps psychologically more suited to indirect inquiry, Sullivan emphasized extratransference inquiry in his analytic work with patients and in his technical recommendations. He therefore employed a “third person” or “counterprojec- tive” methodology (cf. Havens 1976). Impressed with the disruptive power of anxiety and mindful of patients’ emotional vulnerability, Sullivan held that trans- ference (or countertransference) analysis tends to provoke paralyzing levels of anxiety in therapy. Sullivan maintained that it is far easier and more efficient and productive for patients to talk about significant issues in their interpersonal rela- tions with people not immediately present. 3. This list, though extensive, is not exhaustive, either in length or depth. It is more of summary survey or statement. A full, complete comparative study of these points of differences, while important, goes beyond the objectives of this book and is a project for the future. 4. See note 3. 4: The Multidimensional Self 1. Some contemporary analytic theorists of a humanistic coparticipatory sensi- bility have, in fact, offered critiques of interpersonal, relational, and intersubjective theory as neglecting the question of psychological agency. This neglect has often led to excessively interpersonalized notions of the self and its functions. Without a firm sense of the self as agency, psychoanalysis is at risk of becoming a theory of social determinism. Lacking a viable theory of personal agency and allied concepts of per- sonal responsibility, autonomy, and will, the individual (patient or analyst) is reduced to his or her interpersonal field. This of course, impedes the coparticipa- tory process. Prominent among critics of this one–sidedness of contemporary psychoanaly- sis are coparticipant theorists with an “existential-phenomenological” bent, such as Roger Frie (1999, 2001, 2003), Jon Mills (1999), and Jon Frederickson (in press). Frie, for example, in a scholarly critique of postmodern psychoanalysis, asserts that Daseinanalysis bridges the growing philosophic divide between existential- ism and postmodernism. Whereas existentialism emphasizes such notions as agency, autonomy, and individualism, postmodernism celebrates a one- sided dissolution and dispersion of the self. Each perspective taken on its Notes 221