10–13) covers a range of clinical subjects, many of which touch upon cur- rent controversies in psychoanalytic praxis. In this part of the book, I examine the interpretation-relationship controversy as to how psycho- analysis works, and I propose that a “living through” process is essential to psychoanalytic growth. I also discuss what I call “openness to singular- ity,” a set of attitudes and abilities that are essential in promoting analytic vitality and viability. There is also a chapter on transference analysis and one on the “analytic work space.” Various questions and controversies are visited in the chapter on trans- ference, including questions of the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge, analytic authority, the place of authenticity in analysis, the role of uncon- scious communication, the question of transference as an interpersonal phenomenon, modes of listening in psychoanalysis, the question of truth, and working with human uniqueness. The notion of an active, spontaneous coparticipant inquiry has long appealed to me. In my analytic training I found myself drawn to the free- dom of interpersonal psychoanalysis rather than to the Freudian clinical model with its narrow strictures (though I was drawn to Freud’s own, freer, way of working). At the same time, I was also aware of a division in inter- personal thinking between those analysts who, like Fromm, focused clini- cally on individual will and responsibility and defined the analytic process as a human encounter and those interpersonal analysts, who, like Sullivan, saw themselves as experts in interpersonal relations and whose clinical mandate was to carefully attend to the vicissitudes of the individual’s socially determined anxiety and psychopathology. Both of these forms of participant-observation have much to recommend them. Both are in many ways compelling yet each is seriously flawed. Fromm’s approach runs the risk of becoming an authoritarian therapy that is exhortatory and blam- ing, that asks too much of the patient. On the other hand, Sullivan’s nega- tion of unique individuality leads to a clinical denial of the therapeutic role of personal agency, will, choice, and similar aspects of free will. This antinomy is in some ways echoed in the debate between the follow- ers of Kohut and those analysts who advocate a more confronting approach, as does Kernberg. These therapeutic antinomies, at the time, seemed irrec- oncilable, except in reductive terms. Yet I found both approaches com- pelling, both of them truthful and helpful. Similarly, I found obvious merit in Freud’s counsel of analytic reserve, but at the same time, I was inexorably drawn to the spontaneity, aliveness, egalitarianism, and openness to self- exploration of Ferenczi’s radical analytic experiments. Coparticipant inquiry accepts this paradox and acknowledges the ther- apeutic potentials of both perspectives. Not unlike contemporary physi- cists’ acceptance of the paradox of light being both wave and particle Preface xi