various clinical issues are not simply an abstract matter. They are matters of vital significance. Different conceptions of the nature of psychoanalytic data, process, method, and therapeutic action and competing metaphors of the analyst’s therapeutic role—whether the analyst is seen as interpretive surgeon, objective mirror, mirroring self-object, participant observer, con- fronting expert, comforting supporter, participant, or coequal explorer— have very real and significant consequences for analysts and patients. Paradoxically, despite such divisive partisanship in psychoanalysis there has been a significant cross-fertilization of ideas and practices among the different psychoanalytic schools, perhaps more so today than at any pre- vious time in the history of psychoanalysis. Furthermore, there has been a growing heterogeneity within the various analytic schools as well as cog- nate developments among them. This has lead to a blurring of the bound- aries between the different schools, sometimes making it difficult to know what exactly distinguishes one from another. As our psychoanalytic universe has evolved and expanded and become ever more diverse and complex, theorists have tried to impose order on this complexity by formulating comprehensive metamodels of analytic theory and practice. Analysts from different analytic orientations have con- structed meta-metapsychological schemata and meta-methodological par- adigms. Thus, for example, Thompson (1950), Munroe (1955), and Hall and Lindzey (1957), writing from different psychoanalytic or psychologi- cal perspectives, advance classificatory schemas that divide psychoanalytic theory and practice into two incompatible models: the drive (libido) and the relational, cultural-interpersonal, or social-psychological (nonlibido) schools or paradigms. More recently, Greenberg and Mitchell (1983), rep- resenting a relational perspective, similarly divide psychoanalytic theory and practice into two metamodels: the relational and the drive paradigms. Writing from a more clinical perspective, the seminal interpersonalist Wolstein (1977) states that psychoanalytic inquiry has moved from a bio- logical (id) model to an ego-interpersonal or sociological (ego) model and that we are now moving into a third, psychological, model of psycho- analysis and to a coparticipant model of clinical inquiry. From another interpersonal point of view, Levenson (1972, 1991), employing a different clinical typology, asserts that we have moved from the machine age of Freudian analysis through the information paradigm of Sullivanian analy- sis into the “organismic” global time and sensibility of contemporary psy- choanalytic inquiry. Similarly, Kohut (1977), writing from his unique van- tage point of psychology of the self, asserts that we live in the age of tragic, rather than guilty man, and that our work is to restore developmentally 2 Introduction