x FOREWORD
America. By some estimates, $1.5 trillion in assets were stolen. While Rus-
sian became a language commonly spoken in the most fashionable resorts
around the world, Rus sia’s pensioners were becoming increasingly impov-
erished, its educational system, once one of the fi nest in the world, was
decaying, and the Rus sian economy was declining. Life expectancy was
decreasing, while elsewhere (outside of those African countries affl icted
with AIDS) it was on the rise.1
Elsewhere, I have explained why these results should not have been
unexpected.2 Critics of state- owned enterprises (SOEs) argued that they
were subject to corruption; that is, that government offi cials responsible
for managing them often did not act in the interests of those they were
supposed to be serving (i.e., the public). This is an example of a classic
principal- agent problem. But there is an even more serious principal-
agent problem in the privatization process itself. What is at stake is not
just the current fl ts (rents), but the present discounted value of ow of profi
these rents, which is much larger. It follows that incentives for abuse are
all the greater. Moreover, there are a variety of ways by which the extent
of abuse in the running of SOEs can be monitored and controlled (e.g.,
by benchmarking), but experience suggests that it may be more diffi cult
to control abuses within the privatization pro cess. Standard remedies
have focused on the use of auction processes, but in Rus sia and elsewhere
it became clear that there is ample scope for auctions to be rigged by set-
ting the rules (including “qualifying” bidders).
Other failures of privatization arose when monopolies (especially natu-
ral monopolies) were privatized before regulatory and antitrust systems
were put into place. The private sector was better at exploiting monopoly
power than the government: overall economic effi ciency was not enhanced.
Monopoly in Mexico’s telecommunications sector, the result of a poorly
designed privatization, has helped create one of the richest men in the
world. High telephone prices, however—a multiple of those in India—
have not helped Mexico’s development.
But while privatization has deservedly had its critics, so have SOEs.
Many have not been run effi ciently, and many have created losses that have
been a burden on the state—money that could have been used for educa-
tion or to pursue other developmental objectives. There are instances of
corruption. Even advocates of state own ership, like Greece’s socialist prime
minister, Andrea Papandreou, talked of the challenges of “socializing” the
SOEs,3 making them act in ways that were consistent with social objec-
tives, not just the interests of their managers and workers.