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The Mutual Fund Industry: Competition and Investor Welfare Page 187 (211 of 252)
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Notes
Foreword
1. Irving L. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management Inc. et al., 694 F.2d
923 (2d Cir. 1982).
2. Jerry N. Jones et al. v. Harris Associates L.P., 527 3d. 627 (7th Cir. 2008).
Introduction
1. Goldman, “Product Differentiation and Advertising: Some Lessons from So-
viet Experience,” pp. 346– 356.
2. Mutual funds allow investors to pool their money and obtain professional
money management in stocks, bonds, and money market investments. This
pooling provides the benefi cation and risk management at a ts of asset diversifi
lower cost than what most individuals can achieve by creating and managing
their own equivalent portfolios.
3. For con ve nience we use price and the annual fees mutual fund investors pay
interchangeably. Price competition in this sense refers to the fees paid by
investors.
4. Bogle, “The Mutual Fund Industry 60 Years Later: For Better or Worse?” pp.
15– 24.
5. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Investment Trusts and In-
vestment Companies (1939– 1941); and Farina, Freeman, and Webster, “The
Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey,” pp. 732– 983.
6. For a review of pertinent cases up to 1982, see Rogers and N. Benedict, “Money
Market Fund Management Fees: How Much Is Too Much?” pp. 1059– 1125.
