Index

abuses, mutual fund industry, 2–3
actively managed equity funds performance comparisons, 147, 148, 183, 184–185, 186
activity-based allocation of costs, 118–119
advisory contracts market, 36, 193n15
Allianz NFJ Dividend Value fund, 87, 88
allocation of costs: activity-based, 118–119;
alternative based, 118; examples of, 117–118; measurement of, 117–119
American Century Investments, 104–105
analytical framework, 160
anecdotal evidence, 152–153
announced price, 6
annual redemption rates, 91, 94
appellate court decision, Gartenberg, 34–44;
on advisory contracts market, 36, 193n15;
arguments against, 36–37, 38–39, 41, 43–44, 46; on competition among funds, 35–37; competition rejection in, 24, 193n24; competitively insignificant fees and, 37–38, 193n19; conclusions about, 46–47; cost-based theory of value and, 43; on determining excessive fees, 39, 43, 46, 193n22; on fall-out benefits, 33, 41–42, 193n27; further economic issues raised by, 42–44, 194n28, 194n30; investment adviser replacement and, 38–39; on investor mobility, 37–38; monopoly pricing and, 42, 194n30; overview of, 34–35; subadvisers and, 193n17; subsequent court decisions regarding, 44–45, 194n38. See also district court decision, Gartenberg
arm’s-length bargaining, 28
asset distribution: causation regarding, 205n34; price range and, 111–112, 205n34–35
asset values by rates of return/years investing, 19
attributes: defined, 6; price competition and, 6–7, 153; Wal-Mart example regarding, 153
auto industry market segments, 52–53
back-end load fees, 151–152
board of directors: conflict of interest, 130, 208n2; excessive fees and, 22–23, 154–155; regulation of, 154–155
Bogle, John, 126, 136–137, 208n3
bond funds: annual redemption rates, 91, 94;
vs. money market funds, 95; number of, 83
Broad Street complex, 133
Brown, Stuart B., 105–106, 199n1, 200n3, 202n18–19, 202n22, 203n24, 209n12
Canada, price dispersion, 205n35
cash balance plans, 14
closed-end mutual funds, 188n9
Collins, Sean, 106, 203n24
collusion, 82
commingled investment pool, 100, 20012
competition: absence of, 1; conventional indices of, 81–82; Jones case and, 195139.
See also price competition
complexes, fund: attributes, 6; changes in shares regarding, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92–93; competition between, 175; defined, 18814; demand for, 161–163; discrete choice model regarding, 53–54; economies of scale, 119, 120, 121–122, 123, 124–125; entry of new, 84, 87, 88–89; equity fund concentration and, 82, 84, 86; goodwill, 163–164; model simulations of, 167–168; number of, 82, 83; selection factors, 53–54; share of industry assets, 84; single-nested model and, 160–161; survivor technique and, 120, 121–122, 123
concentration, mutual fund industry, 82, 84, 85–86
conflict of interest: director by-offs and, 130, 20812; governance structure and, 20–22, 130, 134–135; internal management and, 131–134; investment advisers and, 20–22, 19018; not-for-profit and, 130, 131, 134–135, 20815; performance comparisons and, 143–147; principal findings on, 153–154; TIAA-CREF and, 142–143; Vanguard and, 135–142; vertical integration and, 131, 20814
consumer choice, 48, 19511
cost function: defined, 164; economies of scale and, 164–166, 166; economies of scope and, 166–167; extreme value model and, 174–175
cost-price elasticity: calculation of, 163; competition studies flaws regarding, 52; defined, 19610; statistical regression analysis and, 60, 61, 178–179
defurred load charge, 58, 19718
defined benefit plan: vs. cash balance plans, 14; explained, 3–4, 18815; government, 16–17; Pension Protection Act of 2006 and, 15; shift from, 13–14, 18919
defined contribution plan: explained, 4, 18813; government and, 16–17; growth, 14–15, 18910; Pension Protection Act of 2006 and, 15–16; shift to, 13–14, 18919
demand function: calculation, 161–163; parameters, 164, 173
demand schedule, 56, 19716
descriptive statistics, in discrete choice model, 58, 59
dimensions of differentiation, 53
direct purchases, 93, 19818
disclosure, 29, 155, 21111
discount brokers, 93
discrete choice model: demand measured via, 53, 19611; descriptive statistics and, 58, 59; dimensions of differentiation in, 53; distribution channels and, 54–55, 58, 60; estimating demand/price elasticities using, 57–73; investment advisers’ behavior and, 56–57; investor behavior and, 55–56; June 2004 example using, 60, 61, 62, 19719–20; large complexes and, 53–54; outside goods and, 169; price elasticities and, 60, 61, 178–179; product differentiation and, 62; profit implication calculation in, 60, 62, 63–72, 19719–20; simulation results of, 75–79; simulations of, 73–79, 167–168
distribution channels: direct purchases, 93, 19818; discrete choice model and, 54–55, 58, 60; financial advisers and, 93, 111, 20512; front-end loads and, 93–94, 19914; full-service brokerage houses, 92, 93; industry structure and, 91, 93–94; loads and, 93–94; price dispersion and, 110–111, 20413, 20512; principles of differentiation generalized extreme value model and, 174–175; retirement accounts and, 93; 12b-1 fees and, 93, 19915
district court decision, Gartenberg, 32–34.
See also appellate court decision, Gartenberg
Dodge & Cox International Stock fund, 87, 88
Dreyfus, 90, 91, 92
economies of scale: assumptions about, 112–113, 20613; calculating, 164–166, 166,
175; cost function and, 164–166, 166; critics’ arguments on, 112–113; equity funds, 119, 123, 124–125; expected results, 77–79, 78, 79; expense ratios/asset sizes measuring, 115–117; fund complexes, 119, 120, 121–122, 123, 124–125; Gartenberg case on, 113, 206\textsuperscript{n}41; monopoly pricing and, 114–115, 206\textsuperscript{n}44; multiproduct firms and, 117–119; no expected results, 75–77, 76, 77; operating cost increases and, 114, 206\textsuperscript{n}45; price competition and, 112–125; prior studies on, 115–117, 206\textsuperscript{n}49; regression models measuring, 117; SEC on, 206\textsuperscript{n}38, 206\textsuperscript{n}49; in short-/long-run, 114–115; survivor technique and, 119–125; Wharton report and, 113, 116–117 economies of scope, 166–167, 174 effective price, 6 Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Gartenberg case, 45 empirical estimation: of nested logit demand model, 169, 170; of price elasticities, 169–171 employer-based retirement plans, 93 England, 205\textsuperscript{n}35 entry, case of, 152 equity funds: actively managed, 147, 148, 185, 184–185, 186; annual redemption rates, 91, 94; changes in shares regarding, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92–93; concentration by investment category, 82, 84, 85, 86; economies of scale, 119, 123, 124–125; entry of new, 84, 87, 88–89; expense ratios and, 127; vs. money market funds, 95; number of, 82, 83; performance comparisons, 144–146, 145, 147, 148, 183, 184–185, 186; principal findings regarding, 151–154; survivor technique and, 123, 124–125; switching, 151–152 exchange traded funds (ETFs): entry of, 152; as product innovation, 95 expense ratios: economies of scale and, 115–117; fund types and, 127; price competition and, 126–128; price dispersion and, 107–108, 109; principal findings regarding, 151; trends in, 126–127; 12b-1/load fees and, 126 external management: assessing, 131–134, 209\textsuperscript{n}11; history of, 152–153; vs. internal, 20, 131–134, 190\textsuperscript{n}3, 208\textsuperscript{n}4, 209\textsuperscript{n}11; principle findings on, 153–154; SEC and, 133, 209\textsuperscript{n}11; Wharton School of Finance and Commerce and, 209\textsuperscript{n}11 extreme value model. See principles of differentiation generalized extreme value model fall-out benefits, 31, 33, 41–42, 193\textsuperscript{n}27 fee breakpoints, 32 fee disparities: dissimilar advisory products and, 101–102; estimates of retail/institutional management, 105–106; factors explaining, 100–101; identical/similar advisory products and, 102–105; market segment, 100–107, 200\textsuperscript{n}3 fee waivers, 6, 95–96, 97, 199\textsuperscript{n}25 fees, excessive: adviser/board of directors relationship and, 22–23, 154–155; critics view of, 20–24, 99–100, 199\textsuperscript{n}1; disclosure regulating, 155, 211\textsuperscript{n}1; Gartenberg case regarding, 32–44, 46, 193\textsuperscript{n}22; governance structure/interest conflict and, 20–22, 130, 207\textsuperscript{n}1; historical background, 18–29; hypothesis, 151; ideas for resolving, 150–151, 208\textsuperscript{n}3–4; investor mobility and, 23, 190\textsuperscript{n}11; investor sensitivity to, 23; 1924-1940, 24–26; principal findings regarding, 151–154; private action cases regarding, 26, 191\textsuperscript{n}27; regulation and, 28–29, 154–156; SEC report on, 26, 27–28; study observations regarding, 99–100; transfer of wealth via, 18, 19; Wharton School report on, 26, 27 Fidelity: changes in shares in, 89, 90, 91, 92; low fee promotions, 95; price competition by, 152 fiduciary duty: definitions of, 192\textsuperscript{n}35; district vs. appellate court regarding, 32, 192\textsuperscript{n}7; Gartenberg district court decision and, 32–34; Section 36(b) on, 28, 34, 191\textsuperscript{n}34 financial advisers: distribution channels and, 93, 111, 205\textsuperscript{n}32; price dispersion and, 111, 205\textsuperscript{n}32
Front-end loads: distribution channels and, 93–94, 199n14; switching and, 151–152
full-service brokerage houses, 92, 93
fund age, 58
fund capitalization classifications, 58
fund family. See complexes, fund
fund supermarkets, 93

Gallus case, 45

Gartenberg case: appellate court decision in, 34–44; assumptions underlying, 81; background of, 31–32; conclusions about, 46–47; district court decision in, 32–34; economies of scale and, 113, 206n41; excessive fees and, 32–44, 43, 46, 193n22; factors leading to, 30–31; fund industry since, 81–98; retail vs. institutional fees and, 201n8; subsequent court decisions regarding, 44–45, 194n38
goodwill law of motion, 163–164, 174
governance structure: adviser replacement and, 22, 190n8; competition and, 21–22; conflict of interest and, 20–22, 150, 207n1; internal vs. external, 20, 131–134, 190n3, 208n4; SEC regulation of, 20–21, 154–155; Vanguard Group, 157, 141–142, 203n26
Government Accountability Office (GAO): expense ratios and, 127; fee disclosure and, 29
government pension plans, 16–17
growth: defined contribution plan, 14–15, 189n9; government pension plans, 16–17; Individual Retirement Account plans, 14–15; market share vs. new money, 51–52; money market funds, 30–31; mutual fund industry, 11, 12, 13–17, 26, 82; in retirement plans, 11, 13–17

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 84, 198n5
horizontal mergers, 84, 198n5
hybrid funds: annual redemption rates, 91, 94; number of, 83
hypothesis, excessive fees, 151

Individual Retirement Account (IRA) plans: creation of, 13, 189n7; growth, 14–15; Pension Protection Act of 2006 and, 15–16; types of, 13
institutional investors: adviser replacement and, 100, 201n5; dissimilar advisory products and, 101–102, 201n7–8; fee difference estimates regarding, 105–106, 202n8–19, 202n22, 203n24; fee disparities and, 100–107, 200n3; identical/similar advisory products and, 102–105
institutional management fees, 105–106, 201n8, 202n8–19, 202n22, 203n24
interests, alignment of, 155–156
internal management: assessing, 131–134, 209n11; vs. external, 20, 131–134, 190n3, 208n4, 209n11; history of, 132–133; principle findings on, 153–154; SEC and, 133, 209n11; TIAA-CREF, 142–143; Vanguard, 137, 141–142; Wharton School of Finance and Commerce and, 209n11
investment advisers: asset size regarding, 56, 197n15; behavior, 56–57; board of directors and, 22–23, 154–155; collusion, 82; conflict of interest and, 20–22, 190n8; demand schedule regarding, 56, 197n16; interest alignment and, 155–156; marginal investors and, 56–57; monopoly profits and, 199n1; principal findings regarding, 151; profit motive and, 153; replacement of, 22–23, 38–39, 100, 190n9, 201n5; self-interest, 56; share ownership by, 156
Investment Advisers Act (IAA), 3
Investment Company Act (ICA), 2–3; amendment of, 28; board of directors and, 154–155; expense ratios and, 127; management malfeasance and, 25–26; Section 36(b) of, 28, 191n34
Investment Company Institute (ICI), 96
investor: behavior, 55–56; fee sensitivity, 23, 96, 151; fund selection, 161; interest alignment, 155–156; marginal, 56–57; mobility, 23, 37–38, 55–56, 91, 190n11
Jones case: Gartenberg case and, 45, 194n38; on market competition, 195n39
Kuhnen, Camelia M., 208n2
law of motion, 163–164, 174
law of one price, 99, 108, 110
Litan, Robert E., 111, 205
load charge, deferred, 58, 197n18
load fees, 126
load funds: distribution channels and, 93–94; expense ratios and, 127
long-term fund annual redemption rates, 91, 94
management costs, portfolio: comparing, 103–105; duties regarding, 103–104, 201n11; measurement challenges in, 104–105, 202n17; subadvisory fees and, 104, 106, 201n13, 202n122
management fees, retail vs. institutional, 105–106, 201n18, 202n18–19, 202n22, 203n24
management malfeasance: closed/open-end funds and, 24–25; early regulation of, 25–26; net asset value reporting and, 24, 191n18; 1924–1940, 24–26
marginal investors, 56–57
market segmentation parameters, 176
market segments: auto industry examples of, 52–53; dissimilar advisory products and, 101–102; fee difference estimates between, 105–106; fee disparities between, 100–107, 200n13; identical/similar advisory products and, 102–105
Marwick, Peat, 193n27
Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund (MIGSF), 132
Massachusetts Investors Trust (MIT), 24, 132, 190n3
McFadden, Daniel, 160
Merrill Lynch: appellate court decision concerning, 34–44; district court decision regarding, 32–34; fee breakpoints, 32; Gartenberg case background, 31–32
mobility, investor, 23, 37–38, 55–56, 91, 190n11
model simulations. See simulations, model models: analytical framework of, 160; overview of, 159–160. See also specific model
money market funds: vs. equity/bond funds, 95; fee breakpoints, 32; growth of, 30–31; number of, 82, 83
monopoly pricing: economies of scale and, 114–115, 206n44; fair/unfair, 42, 194n30
monopoly profits, 199n1
“Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New Evidence and A Fair Fiduciary Duty Test” (Freeman, Brown, & Pomerantz, 199n1)
mutual fund industry: abuses, 2–3; annual redemption rates, 91, 94; changes in fund/complex shares, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92–93, 198n7; concentration, 82, 84, 85–86; defined, 187n2; disclosure of information, 155, 211n1; distribution channels, 91, 93–94; economies of scale, 112–125; entry of new funds/complexes, 84, 87, 88–89; fee waivers, 6, 95–96, 97, 199n25; Gartenberg, since, 81–98; growth, 11, 12, 13–17, 26, 82; investor fee sensitivity, 23, 96, 151; low fees promotion, 95, 96; number of fund/fund complexes, 82, 83; Pension Protection Act of 2006, 15–16; pricing, 4–7; principal findings regarding, 151–154; product innovations, 95; retirement assets, 3–4; SEC report, 26, 27–28; structure, 81–91; Wharton School of Finance and Commerce report, 26, 27
nested logit demand model: empirical estimation in, 160; variables, 170
net asset value (NAV), 24, 191n18
net price calculation, 163
New Covenant Trust fund, 87, 89
no-load funds: shift to, 93; switching, 151–152
not-for-profit structure, 29; as conflict of interest solution, 130, 131, 134–135, 208n3; examples of, 131; principal findings on, 153–154; profit maximization in, 134–135; TIAA-CREF, 142–143; Vanguard, 137, 141–142, 210n26
number of mutual funds, by investment categories, 82, 83
open-end mutual funds, 3, 188n9
outside goods, 169
outside goods variable, 58, 59
passively managed funds, 146, 146–147, 183, 184–185, 186
pension plans, government, 16–17
Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, 15–16
perfect competition model, 108, 110, 204
performance contract, 5
Pomerantz, Steve, 106, 199 n1, 202 n19, 203 n24, 209 n12
pooling, 187 n2
portfolio management costs: comparing, 103–105; duties regarding, 103–104, 201 n11; measurement challenges in, 104–105, 202 n17; subadvisory fees and, 104, 106, 201 n13, 202 n22
price competition: abuses, 3; ambiguity, 4; anecdotal evidence of, 152–153; appellate court decision, Gartenberg, on, 24, 35–37, 193 n24; attributes and, 6–7, 153; changes in fund/complex shares revealing, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92–93; between complexes, 175; concentration and, 82, 84, 84, 84–95; controversy, 1–2; defined, 187 n12; demand studies, 49, 50–51, 51–52; disclosure of information and, 155, 211 n1; discrete choice models and, 53, 196 n11; distribution channels and, 91, 93–94; economies of scale and, 112–115; entry of new funds/complexes supporting, 84, 87, 88–89; expense ratios and, 126–128; fee disparities and, 100–107; fee waivers and, 95–96, 97, 199 n12; governance structure and, 21–22; indirect tests, 49, 195 n12; industry abuses and, 5; key test of, 57; law of one price and, 99; market segments and, 52–53, 100–107; model simulations calculating, 73–79, 167–168; new entry/new products and, 152; outdated/ambiguous studies of, 8; perfect competition model and, 108, 110, 204 n28; pillars, 48, 195 n1; price dispersion and, 107–112; principal findings regarding, 151–154; prior studies, 49–52; product innovations and, 95; regulatory proposals for strengthening, 28–29; retirement accounts and, 2; statistical regression analysis testing, 57–73; study flaws, 51–52, 196 n17; supply/demand model and, 7–8; switching promoting, 151–152; Wharton School report and, 27
price dispersion: asset distribution/price range and, 111–112, 205 n34–35; competition and, 107–112; evidence on, 110–111; financial advisers and, 111, 205 n32; perfect competition and, 108, 110, 204 n28; range of expense ratios, 107–108, 109; reasons for, 110–111, 204 n31, 205 n32; SEC study and, 108; S&P 500 index funds and, 108, 109, 204 n26; U.S. vs. other countries, 111–112, 205 n35; Wharton study and, 108, 204 n27
price elasticity: calculation of, 162–163; defined, 195 n6; demand studies on, 49, 50–51, 51–52; empirical estimation of, 169–171; estimating, 57–73; market share vs. new money growth and, 51–52; statistical regression analysis and, 60, 61, 178–179. See also cross-price elasticity
price range: asset distribution and, 111–112, 205 n34–35; causation regarding, 205 n34
price sensitivity: consumer choice and, 48, 195 n1; defined, 48; investor, 23, 96, 151
pricing: attributes and, 6–7; complexity of, 4–5; fee waivers, 6; initial, 5; mutual fund, 4–7; performance contract and, 5
Prime Reserve Fund, 118
Primecap Fund, 140, 210 n27
principal findings, 151–154
principles of differentiation generalized extreme value model, 160; competition between complexes and, 175; cost function/goodwill in, 174–175; demand for funds in, 171–173; estimation of, 176; solving extreme value equation in, 180–180; theoretical aspects of, 176–177, 180; two-nested model and, 171
private action cases, 26, 191 n27
product innovations, 95
products, advisory: dissimilar, 101–102; entry of, 152; identical/similar, 102–105
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 25
reasonableness standard, 32, 192 n7
regression demand equation, 197 n17
regression models, measuring economies of scale, 117
regression results for two-nested model, 178–179
regulation: adviser share ownership, 156; board of directors, 154–155; excessive fees and, 28–29, 154–156; harm done by, 150; information disclosure, 155, 211n1; price lowering, 6; price raising, 5; 36(b) and, 156
regulatory: adviser share ownership, 156; board of directors, 154–155; excessive fees and, 28–29, 154–156; harm done by, 150; information disclosure, 155, 211n1; price lowering, 6; price raising, 5; 36(b) and, 156
relative market share, 77, 79
retail fund investors: adviser replacement and, 100; dissimilar advisory products and, 101–102, 201n7–8; fee difference estimates regarding, 105–106, 202n18–19, 202n22, 203n12; fee disparities and, 100–107, 200n3; identical/similar advisory products and, 102–105
retail management fees, 105–106, 201n8, 202n18–19, 202n22, 203n12
retirement accounts: distribution channels and, 93; growth of, 11, 13–17; price competition and, 2. See also Individual Retirement Account plans
retirement assets, 3–4
San Diego government pension plan, 16 Schuyt case, 24, 193n24
Section 36(b): costs/benefits of, 156; economies of scale and, 113, 206n41; on fiduciary duty, 28, 34, 191n34; of Investment Company Act, 28, 191n34
Securities Act of 1933, 25
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): board of directors and, 154–155; economies of scale and, 206n38, 206n49; fee disparities and, 100, 200n3; fund industry report by, 26, 27–28; governance structure/conflict of interest and, 20–21, 154–155; industry abuses investigated by, 2–3; internal/external management and, 133, 200n11; Investment Company Act amendment and, 28; price dispersion and, 108; regulation by, 150
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 25
segmentation parameters, 176
self-interest: investment advisers and, 56; investor behavior and, 55–56; studies, 196n13
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 45, 194n38
simulations, model: changes in relative costs/fees/goodwill, 76, 78; changes in relative market share, 77, 79; expected economies of scale results, 77–79, 78, 79; homogeneous product results in, 75; no expected economies of scale results, 75–77, 76, 77; parameters, 73–75; questions addressed, 73; results, 75–79; scenarios used, 73, 74–75; simplifying assumptions, 73–74, 197n21; between two complexes, 167–168
single-nested model: complex goodwill in, 163–164; cost function, 164–167; demand for complexes/funds, 166–163; purpose of using, 160–161
S&P 500 index funds: price dispersion and, 108, 109, 204n26; price range/asset distribution and, 111
statistical regression analysis: descriptive statistics used in, 58, 59; distribution channels used in, 58, 60; June 2004 example using, 60, 61, 62, 197n19–20; other results from, 73; price competition tested via, 57–73; price elasticities and, 60, 61, 178–179; product differentiation and, 62; profit implication calculated in, 60, 62, 63–72, 197n19–20; regression demand equation and, 197n17
stock turnover ratio, 58
subadvisers: Gartenberg regarding, 193n17; portfolio management costs and, 104, 106, 201n13, 202n12; Vanguard Group and, 106, 136, 137, 139–140, 202n22, 209n13, 209n15, 210n27
supply/demand model, 7–8
Supreme Court, U.S., 45, 194n38
survivor technique: assumptions of, 119–120; economies of scale estimated via, 119–125; equity funds and, 123, 124–125; fund complexes and, 120, 121–122, 123
Swensen, David, 130
switching, 151–152
T. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, 118
Teachers Advisors. See TIAA-CREF
TIAA-CREF: actively managed equity fund comparisons, 147, 148, 183, 184–185, 186;
TIAA-CREF (continued)
conflict of interest and, 142–143; equity fund comparisons, 144, 145, 146; fee increases, 143; history, 142; ideal structure of, 29; low fee promotions, 95; overview of, 131; passively managed fund comparisons, 146, 146–147, 183, 184–185, 186; performance comparisons, 143–149; principle findings on, 153–154 12b-1 fees: distribution channels and, 93, 199n15; expense ratios and, 126; management costs and, 202n17 two-nested model, 171; regression results for, 178–179

United States (U.S.), price dispersion, 111–112, 205n35
utility maximization, random, 160

Vanguard Group: actively managed equity fund comparisons, 147, 148, 183, 184–185, 186; changes in shares in, 89, 90, 91, 93; conflict of interest and, 135–142; critics arguments for, 135–136, 209n12; equity mutual funds, 138–140; governance structure, 137, 141–142, 210n26; history, 136–137; ideal structure of, 29; indexed fund, 137; internal management, 137, 141–142; low fee promotions, 95; overview of, 131; passively managed fund comparisons, 146, 146–147, 183, 184–185, 186; performance comparisons, 143–149; principle findings on, 152–154; profits, 137, 141–142, 210n28; subadviser fees, 106, 136, 137, 202n22, 209n13, 210n27; subadvisers, 136, 137, 139–140, 209n15 Vantage Point Advisors fund, 87, 89
vertical integration: as conflict of interest solution, 131, 208n4; examples of, 131; vs. nonvertical, 132

waivers, fee, 6, 95–96, 97, 199n25
Wallison, Peter J., 111, 209n35
Wal-Mart example, 153
Walsh, Lori, 196n17
Wellington Management Company, 136–137
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce: economies of scale and, 113, 116–117; fee disparities and, 100, 200n3; fund industry report by, 26, 27; internal/external management and, 209n11; price dispersion and, 108, 204n27

Zhang, Andrew, 196n7