The Arrow Impossibility Theorem

Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen

eISBN: 9780231526869

2014 (168 pages )

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Complete Book Download (pages 1-163)

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Front Matter (pages 1-5)

Download Table of Contents
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Table of Contents (pages 6-7)

Download Acknowledgments
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Acknowledgments (pages 8-11)

Download Introduction, by Prasanta K. Pattanaik
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Introduction, by Prasanta K. Pattanaik (pages 12-33)

Download Part 1: The Lectures
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Part 1: The Lectures (pages 34-35)

Download Opening Remarks, by Joseph E. Stiglitz
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Opening Remarks, by Joseph E. Stiglitz (pages 36-39)

Download Arrow and the Impossibility Theorem, by Amartya Sen
(pages 40-53)
Arrow and the Impossibility Theorem, by Amartya Sen (pages 40-53)

Download The Arrow Impossibility Theorem: Where Do We Go From Here?, by Eric Maskin
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The Arrow Impossibility Theorem: Where Do We Go From Here?, by Eric Maskin (pages 54-67)

Download Commentary, by Kenneth J. Arrow
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Commentary, by Kenneth J. Arrow (pages 68-75)

Download Part II: Supplemental Materials
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Part II: Supplemental Materials (pages 76-77)

Download The Informational Basis of Social Choice, by Amartya Sen
(pages 78-111)
The Informational Basis of Social Choice, by Amartya Sen (pages 78-111)

Download On The Robustness of Majority Rule, by Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin
(pages 112-153)
On The Robustness of Majority Rule, by Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin (pages 112-153)

Download The Origins of the Impossibility Theorem, by Kenneth J. Arrow
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The Origins of the Impossibility Theorem, by Kenneth J. Arrow (pages 154-159)

Download Notes on Contributors
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Notes on Contributors (pages 160-163)

The Arrow Impossibility Theorem

Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking “impossibility theorem” was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence.

In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow’s theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem’s value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal—given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.

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