NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. The GFMD (2011) is a nonbinding, voluntary, and government-led process that seeks to address the migration and development interconnections in practical and action-oriented ways.

2. The GMG (2011) is an interagency conglomerate bringing together heads of U.N. agencies and international organizations to promote the wider application of all relevant international and regional instruments and norms relating to migration and to encourage the adoption of more coherent, comprehensive, and better coordinated approaches to the issues of international migration.

3. RCPs bring together representatives of states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations for informal and nonbinding dialogue and information exchange on migration-related issues of common interest and concern (IOM 2011).

1. DEVELOPMENT AND MIGRATION

1. The International Committee on Migration and Development Research of the Social Science Research Council organized a conference, Migration and Development: Future Directions for Research and Policy, in New York City February 28–March 1, 2008, to address central theoretical and practical issues that would benefit from future internationally comparative and interconnective research. The project proposed here grows in part out of the papers and discussions at that conference (http://essays.ssrc.org/developmentpapers/?page_id=3).

2. In contrast to our use of transition to indicate universal migratory and developmental transformations, Castles and Miller (2009) use the term to describe the process by which temporary migrants become permanent settlers.

3. This chapter is based on data that can serve as indicators for all four transitions in 2005, the most recent year for which contemporaneous national indicators are available for a large majority of nations in all regions of the world. Although the national data come from the United Nations, we have not compiled the national data into precisely the same subregions used by that organization.
(particularly in Europe). In examining more recent but less evenly available national data for the same indicators, we have found no substantive differences in the results.

4. While not particularly interesting theoretically, some exceptions seem to result from data inconsistencies. For example, United Nations data indicate that Western Europe is less urbanized than Northern Europe, but this may be the result of countries in the two subregions defining urban differently. In Western Europe, for example, Switzerland defines communes with more than 10,000 persons as urban, while Belgium and Austria reserve the label for locations with more than 5,000 persons, and France more than 3,000; in Northern Europe, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden define as urban those locations that have as few as 200 people (United Nations 2007d).

5. Easterlin’s (1961) article, “Essays in the Quantitative Study of Economic Growth,” appeared in a special issue of the journal Economic Development and Cultural Change, which was presented to Simon Kuznets on his sixtieth birthday by his students and friends.

6. Another theoretical approach that examines linkages between development and international migration focuses on the global impact of labor markets (e.g., Petras 1981; Cohen 1987; Potts 1990; Williamson 2005; Pritchett 2006). We do not examine here this approach’s important contributions because of space limitations and because the dynamics of centralized labor markets do not seem as analytically relevant as world-systems to the analysis of regional development and migration transitions.

3. BRINGING CULTURE BACK IN

1. This chapter is based on our ongoing individual and joint fieldwork during the past twenty years. We draw on examples from Latin America and South Asia to illustrate our points. For a more in-depth discussion of study methods and findings, see Levitt 2001, 2007.

5. FAMILY AND SCHOOL RECONFIGURATION

1. The twentieth Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, Article 416, “advocates the beginning of universal citizenship, free mobility of all inhabitants of the planet and the progressive ending of the foreigner condition”; Article 7 “demands respect for human rights, in particular for the rights of migrants” (Constitución de la República del Ecuador 2009: 183). Moreover both section 3, “Human Mobility,” and section 10, “Population and Human Mobility,” emphasize the right to migrate and to ask for refugee status and appeal to the principle of universal citizenship. With this constitutional proposal, Ecuador bets on a new conception of citizenship that points toward the principle of free informed mobility, entry in receiving countries, and local and regional development due to the free movement of persons.

2. It is estimated that for the corresponding year, while poverty in rural areas remained stable, in urban areas it increased by 100 percent on the coast and by 80 percent in the cities of the Sierra region (Vela 2006:25).
3. During 1999 Ecuador experienced one of the most severe impoverishments in the history of Latin America. Between 1990 and 2001 national poverty increased from 39 to 65 percent (Rojas 2007:3). It was also accompanied by a higher concentration of wealth: in 1999 the poorest 20 percent received 4.6 percent of the income, and by 2000 they received less than 2.5 percent. On the other hand, the richest 20 percent of the population had 52 percent of the wealth in 1990, and by 2000 they had 61 percent. Also, the GDP fell dramatically, by 30 percent, compared to 1998, and the unemployment rate reached 14 percent in 1999 (Acosta 2006:10–11).

4. One of the defining features of Calderón, as well as of the Oyacoto commune, is that since the 1970s it has been a receiving point for the internal flow of migrants; since the end of the 1990s it has also received an inflow of international immigrants coming from Colombia, Peru, and recently from Cuba. As a matter of fact, 24.2 percent of Calderón’s population is immigrant in origin, mostly from other provinces in the Ecuadorian highlands (PROREDES 2006b:2–6; INEC 2001). In the case of Cañar, this locality has been living with migratory behavior for more than forty years. First, the 1960s experienced an important outflow of its inhabitants to the nation’s coast; then, since the 1970s, international emigration to the United States started to predominate. Finally, in the past decade, the international destinations have diversified to include Spain. It is estimated that currently four out of ten households are involved in migratory practices (Escobar 2008).

5. Before our ethnographic research was undertaken in Oyacoto (February 2007), there were no quantitative or qualitative data about the life conditions in this community or more relevant information about emigration processes that affected it. The data available refer to the urban parish where this community is located: Calderón, one of the parishes that form the Metropolitan District of Quito (MDQ), capital of Pichincha Province and of Ecuador. The population of the parish is 84,219; 39.54 percent are poor with unsatisfied basic needs, and 11.99 percent live in extreme poverty. While migratory density in Calderón is 6.6 percent, MDQ’s varies between 3.1 and 6 percent of the population. Hence Calderón is the parish with the highest migration rate in the capital city (INEC 2001). Therefore, the following findings emerge from an ethnographic immersion in the community and in-depth interviews with local spokespersons.

6. WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND MIGRATION

1. Women as refugees and as asylum seekers.

2. Based on the marital status of women at the time of migration and on their employment status, Thadani and Todaro (1984) identified four variants of female migration: (1) married women in search of employment, (2) unmarried women in search of employment or for marital reasons, (3) unmarried women migrating for marital reasons, and (4) married women migrating for family reunification with no thought of employment.

3. It can be argued that “migration” from Mexico to the United States started as early as 1848 with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that ended the Mexican-American War (1846–48) and by which Mexico lost more than half of its prewar territory to the United States.
4. Recently governments and international organizations have been devoting a lot of attention and resources to the potential link between remittances and development. One issue, however, that has not been fully discussed by governments or international organizations is the fact that remittances constitute a transfer between individuals for very specific purposes. How can we turn these monies into what is commonly known as development?

7. MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Until recently women migrated almost exclusively in the context of family migration. However, it should be noted that, since the 1990s, an increasing proportion of independent labor migrants to Europe and North America are female, which also seems to be the result of general cultural change.

8. THE SOUTHERN CROSSROADS

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3. In 2005 Cape Town conducted a skills audit of its refugee population to better develop policies to capitalize on their presence in the city. Johannesburg has yet to follow suit but has recently officially recognized the potential contributions migrants make to the city.

4. Johannesburg metropolitan government has slowly begun to consider migrants as a vulnerable group, although it is unclear whether any efforts to include migrants in local decision-making priorities are being made.

5. For more on the country’s spatial development perspective, visit http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=514.


7. Interview with Graeme Götz, Strategic Planning Unit, City of Johannesburg, July 18, 2008.

Downloaded from cupola.columbia.edu
9. MIGRATION BETWEEN THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND AUSTRALIA

1. With a quarter of the population born in a foreign country and nearly half the population at any one time being immigrants, the children of immigrants, or temporary migrants, Australia is one of the nations most influenced by international migration.

2. The island nature of Australia means that clandestine international migration is extremely minor.

3. This visa category is analogous to the HB1 visa in the United States.

4. That is, for temporary migrants for whom the intended length of stay is less than twelve months.


6. Migration efficiency is obtained by dividing net migration (in minus out) by gross migration (in plus out) and is a measure of the effectiveness of migration in increasing the numbers of medical workers.

7. That is, people indicating on arrival in Australia they will be staying longer than one year, when in fact they intend not to stay permanently.


9. Moreover Cobb-Clark and Cook (2006) have shown that the refugee-humanitarian migrants were the only visa category to experience a worsening of labor market conditions over the time between the two interviews.

10. Except in the foreign students category.

10. ASIAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

1. The United States had 1.4 million Filipino-born residents in 2000, including two-thirds who arrived before 1990; 45 percent of the Filipino adults in the United States in 2000 were college graduates.

2. There were 1.2 million Chinese-born U.S. residents in 2000, including 53 percent who arrived before 1990; 43 percent of the Chinese adults in the United States in 2000 were college graduates.

3. There were 1 million Indian U.S. residents in 2000, including 45 percent who arrived before 1990; 70 percent of the Indian adults in the United States in 2000 were college graduates.

4. There were 1 million Vietnamese U.S. residents in 2000, including 55 percent who arrived before 1990; 19 percent of Vietnamese adults in the United States in 2000 were college graduates.

5. Admissions record events, not unique individuals, so a foreigner holding an H-1B visa is “admitted” each time he or she reenters the United States.

7. The East Asian economic miracle stands in sharp contrast to the lack of similar 

8. Despite the desires of many labor-sending countries, relatively few Asian migrants 
move under the terms of bilateral agreements and Memoranda of Understanding.

9. Borjas (1994) reexamined Chiswick’s findings and concluded they applied to 
the unique set of circumstances that accompanied the lifting of barriers to Asian im-
migration in the mid-1960s.

10. Khadria (1999) questions the extent of the virtuous circle from Indians settled 
abroad, finding that nonresident Indian investments in India benefit primarily the 
investors rather than India as a whole because the nonresident Indian investors do 
little to directly improve the Indian education and health care systems.

11. For example, South Africa graduates about 1,300 doctors and 2,500 nurses a 
year; those who receive government support for their education must serve two 
years in rural areas before receiving their license to practice. South Africa com-
plained that it spent $1 billion educating health workers who emigrated in the 
1990s, equivalent to a third of the development aid it received from the end of apart-
heid in 1994 to 2000.

12. The International Council of Nurses issued similar recruitment guidelines in 
2001 (www.icn.ch/psrecruit01.htm).

2004. PHR did not recommend that African governments try to prevent the emigra-
tion of health care workers, but did recommend that industrialized countries not 
recruit actively in Africa.

14. Escobar (2008:Table 2) compares remittances per capita and GDP per capita 
in 2003 for selected Lain American countries, finding that in very poor countries 
such as Haiti and Bolivia remittances per capita from Haitians and Bolivians in the 
United States were over four times larger than GDP per capita, e.g., $2,000 per U.S. 
Haitian in remittances versus $500 in GDP per capita. However, in richer countries 
such as Mexico, remittances per capita were less than GDP per capita.

15. The World Bank reported that some migrants in rich countries remitted more 
funds after September 11, 2001, so they would have funds at home if they were de-
ported. Such “defensive remittances” may help to explain the tripling of remittances 

16. Another factor increasing formal remittances is the spread of banks from mi-
grant countries of origin to migrant destinations, where they offer services in the 
migrant’s language as well as ancillary services to migrant relatives at home.

17. Agents in the two countries periodically settle their credit and debit accounts, 
often via a commercial bank.

Hometown Associations (HTAs) raise and invest less than $10,000 in their commu-
nities of origin, and that the effects of such investments are “poorly documented.” In 
particular, Global Economic Prospects asserts that Mexico’s 3x1 program, begun in 
1997, established projects worth $44 million by 2002, but concludes that “HTAs 
have not been very successful” in part because diasporas may not have good informa-
tion on local needs or have different priorities for infrastructure improvements.
19. These students were highly motivated to pursue advanced studies. Before they could do so abroad, however, they had to complete two years of military service and obtain private or overseas financing.


21. The Population Reference Bureau (PRB.org) puts the Philippine population at 90 million in 2008, with a projected 150 million in 2050.


23. Of the 811,000 land-based migrants leaving in 2007, almost 30 percent went to Saudi Arabia, 15 percent went to the UAE, and about 6 percent each went to Hong Kong, Qatar, and Singapore. These five countries absorbed two-thirds of the land-based Filipinos deployed in 2007.


25. Fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in mid-2006 resulted in 6,000 Filipinos, mostly domestic helpers, being flown home; two-thirds were undocumented. Between 1990 and 2005 migration to Lebanon was banned because of frequent mistreatment of domestic helpers. That ban was lifted in 2005 and reimposed in 2006.


29. Fees for unofficial primary schools in urban areas are often $25 or $50 a month. Current law requires high school students seeking to attend college to take entrance exams in the place they are registered to live. Most children who move to urban areas with their parents reportedly drop out of school.

30. Some $7.6 billion of the $14.4 billion in remittances reported by the Philippine Central Bank in 2007 was recorded as coming from the United States; Saudi Arabia was the second leading source of remittances, at $1.1 billion in 2007. The U.S. share of remittances may be inflated by migrants in, e.g., Hong Kong using U.S. banks to transfer remittances (www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/keystat/ofw.htm).

11. INDIAN MIGRANTS TO THE GULF

1. The Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, with the approval of the prime minister of India, decided to appoint a high-level committee on the Indian
diaspora with five members to review the status of persons of Indian origin (POI) and nonresident Indians (NRI) on August 18, 2000. The committee submitted its report on December 19, 2001.

2. Estimates published in the report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora submitted to the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi. Please note that this is not an accurate figure but an underestimate. Unfortunately the government of India has no regular mechanisms to assess the number of Indians living abroad. Most often, high commissioners in respective countries provide the data on Indians living in their countries by request from the Ministry of External Affairs from time to time.

3. A person who, at any time, has held an Indian passport or anyone, either of whose parents or whose grandparents or great-grandparents was born in and was permanently resident in India as defined in the Government of India Act 1935 and other territories that became part of India thereafter, provided he or she was not at any time a citizen of the countries referred in part 2 (b) of Ministry of Home Affairs notification No. 26011/4/98-IC.1 dated March 30, 1999, or the spouse of a citizen of India or person of Indian origin covered in the above categories of PIO. Most of them have taken citizenship of their country of residence, and the strength of their ties with India dies with the passage of time.

4. Stateless population is defined as Indians who stay without valid travel documents in their respective countries.

5. NRIs are Indian citizens holding Indian passports and residing abroad for an indefinite period, whether for employment or for carrying on any business or vacation or for any other purpose.

6. All Indian passport holders need emigration clearance to visit Emigration Check Required (ECR) countries for work abroad. As of this writing, seventeen countries require emigration clearance for ECR passport holders, and the government of India has exempted 174 countries as of 2009 (Irudaya Rajan, Varghese, and Jayakumar 2010). However, few categories of individuals receive a passport with emigration check not required (see Table 11.2 in this book).
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