The City Level in Governance Challenges: Enabling Protection Without Protectionism

Opening up existing formal governance frames to the city level carries significant implications. It can help overcome the narrow nationalisms of interstate negotiated agreements. Large, complex cities share far more with other cities across the world in terms of challenges and the resources they need than they share with their national states and that national states share with each other. Cities share a specific position in a multiscalar global governance system. The ongoing elaboration of the European Union has brought this to the fore, notably in the need for subsidiarity regimes that go from the European to the local level. Given this transnational affinity among cities when it comes to challenges and needed resources, bringing the city level into global regimes might be one of the most effective ways of achieving protection without national protectionism.

If we are to open up macrolevel regimes to this subnational scale, it becomes critical to recognize the specific and specialized difference of the local level. Three features stand out in this regard.

First is that the city level makes possible the implementation and application of forms of scientific knowledge and technological capacities that
are not practical at a national level; this is partly because the city’s multiple ecologies enable the mixing of diverse forms of knowledge and diverse technologies. In doing this, the city introduces a type of environmental governance option that takes a radically different approach from the common and preferred choice of an international carbon trading regime. The aim becomes addressing the carbon and nitrogen cycles in situ by implementing measures that reduce damage in a radical way. Saskia Sassen’s chapter addresses these issues.

Second, introducing the city level into global governance regimes enables what Arthur Moll and Kristine Kern refer to as horizontal governance, encompassing regimes that can work alongside traditional vertical forms of governance. In their chapter, they examine diverse urban initiatives and show us that these initiatives have been an essential part of climate governance from the outset even if not a formal part of the global regime. Leading cities such as London, Stockholm, and New York have become global players, with far more ambitious goals than their national governments. They have developed comprehensive models to make cities carbon-free and climate-proof, thereby contributing to developing climate governance “from below.” This makes visible three crucial challenges for multilevel climate governance: (1) the lack of institutional arrangements that guarantee that national climate policies are implemented at local levels (hierarchical climate governance); (2) the independent development of urban climate protection policies and the bypassing of nation-states (vertical climate governance); and (3) the emergence of horizontal coordination through the establishment of various forms of direct cooperation among cities (horizontal climate governance).

Third, opening up the global regime to the city level brings into the frame a range of troublesome developments that can be avoided at the very general global level. In their respective chapters, Tony Travers and Sophie Body-Gendrot explore city-level challenges such as immigration, racism, extreme forms of inequality, and a proliferation of new types of challenges faced by cities.

Travers sees incorporating cities into the traditional global governance paradigm as “a potential new sphere for research and policy within the field of global governance.” He finds that city mayors and leaders are increasingly willing to join international organizations and to consider wider questions relating to the future development and evolution of metropolitan areas. City leaders have had to confront the direct and indirect impacts
of global conflict, the movement of people, and the management of immigrant communities originating in many different countries. Further, he finds that international politics has begun to create a demand for urban solutions.

Body-Gendrot shows us how conflict is now wired into urban space itself. The reasons are numerous: Extreme inequalities generate the resentment of those confined to the less hospitable urban areas at a time when information reaches the most distant points of the world and makes residents aware of their fate; the fascination and rejection such cities provoke among radical activists such as in the Mumbai terrorist attacks where luxury hotels, among other targets, were hit; the diversity of people leaving and entering these urban spaces, most ready to compete for survival. One effect is that policing and maintaining order become central functions in global cities, a focus that is not helpful in addressing the governance challenges confronting these cities. As a member of the National Council for Professional Standards in Security (known as CNDS, Commission Nationale de Déontologie de la Sécurité) in France, Body-Gendrot receives a large number of complaints from young people regarding this dominance of order maintenance—police harassment, humiliating stops and searches in the gray areas where witnesses will not talk, and powerlessness when it comes to seeking fair treatment and judgments. Body-Gendrot explores what it might take to reorder the priorities of urban government toward major challenges and away from this order maintenance rationale.

We can organize the urbanizing of the various challenges we confront along three vectors:

**Global Warming, Energy, and Water Insecurity**

These and other environmental challenges are going to make cities front-line spaces. These challenges will tend to remain more diffuse for nation-states and for the state itself. One key reason is the more acute and direct dependence of everyday life in cities on massive infrastructures and on institutional-level supports for most people—apartment buildings, hospitals, vast sewage systems, water purification systems, vast underground transport systems, whole electric grids dependent on computerized management vulnerable to breakdowns. We already know that a rise in water levels will flood some of the most densely populated cities in the world.
The urgency of some of these challenges goes well beyond lengthy negotiations and multiple international meetings, still the most common form of engagement at the level of national politics and especially international politics. When global warming hits cities, it will hit hard, and preparedness will be critical. The new kinds of crises and the ensuing violence will be particularly felt in cities. A major simulation by NASA found that, by the fifth day of a breakdown in the computerized systems that manage the electric grid, a major city such as New York would be in an extreme condition and basically unmanageable through conventional instruments.

These challenges are emergent, but before we know it they will become concrete and threatening in cities. This contrasts with possibly slower trajectories at the national level. In this sense, cities are in the frontline and will have to act on global warming whether national states sign on to international treaties or not. Because of this, many cities have had to develop capabilities to handle such challenges. The air quality emergency in cities such as Tokyo and Los Angeles as early as the 1980s is one example: These cities could not wait until an agreement such as Kyoto might appear, nor could they wait until national governments passed mandatory laws (i.e., for car fuel efficiency and zero emissions). With or without an international treaty or a national law, they had to address air quality urgently. And they did.

Asymmetric Wars

When national states go to war in the name of national security, major cities are likely to become a key frontline space in today’s prevalent type of war. In the past, large open fields or oceans were the frontline spaces needed by large armies to engage and fight. Under these conditions, doing war in the name of national security becomes the making of urban insecurity. We can see this today with the so-called War on Terror, whereby the invasion of Iraq became an urban war theater. But we also see the negative impacts of this war in the case of cities that are not even part of the immediate war theater—the bombings in Madrid, London, Casablanca, Bali, Mumbai, Lahore, and so many others. The traditional security paradigm based on national state security fails to accommodate this triangulation. What may be good for the protection of the national state apparatus may go at a high or increasingly higher price to major cities and their people.
Cities also enter the domain of global governance challenges as a site for the enactment of new forms of violence resulting from various crises. We can foresee a variety of forms of violence that are likely to escape the macrolevel normative propositions of good governance. For instance, São Paulo and Rio have seen forms of gang and police violence in the early 2000s that point to a much larger breakdown than the typically invoked fact of inadequate policing. We could say the same about the failures of the powerful U.S. forces in Baghdad. To explain this simply as anarchy is inadequate. Further, immigration and new types of environmental refugees are one particularly acute instance of urban challenges that will require new understandings of the civic.

These and other challenges examined in this section resonate with questions addressed in other parts of this book. As the editors posit in the introduction to part 2:

In the past, the most important external security threat was considered an attack by a foreign state. That threat has all but disappeared since the end of the Cold War. Now the sources of insecurity are usually identified as a range of global risks. Some have to do with potential or actual violence: terrorism, war and counter insurgency, ethnic cleansing, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, massive human rights violence, and organized crime.

In the introduction to part 5, the editors write that

An active global or international civil society has insistently drawn the world’s attention to such issues as global poverty, climate change, disease, and human rights violations. New forms of identity politics around religion or ethnicity are increasingly transnational. Yet this new type of informal politics has no institutional counterpart and no address to which demands can be directed.

This urbanizing of what we have traditionally considered national or international challenges is part of a larger disassembling of the two traditional all-encompassing formats, the nation-state and the interstate system. As some of the chapters in this book signal, there is growing recognition of the multiscalar structures at work in many of our global governance challenges. This opens up possibilities and opportunities for the local level to become part of the larger governance framing of diverse issues.